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Abstract 
Recent revisionist academic legal historians have relocated the Israeli national story within a colonial and 
postcolonial narrative, and in a global context indigenous groups dispossessed from their communal and ancestral 
lands are increasingly re-asserting claims to that land through legal and human rights challenges, deploying 
international human rights law relating to rights to property and minority rights. Waqf property (held in charitable 
trust for religious purposes) is an important element in Muslim societies, and has been subject to large-scale 
transfer to Jewish control since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 (‘redeemed’ for the Jewish people). The role 
of successive Absentee Property Laws in this confiscation derives from Ottoman land tenure, as modified during the 
British League of Nations Mandate over Palestine, and subsequently. The Israeli legal system has, devised and 
utilised various modalities and mechanisms to systematically confiscate Palestinian land in general and more 
specifically the waqf, while also re-establishing shari’a courts and replacing the shari’a court of appeal in Jerusalem. 
Mutawallis (managers of waqf) have to undertake 'forum shopping’ for search for the most suitable court (between 
Israeli civil and shari’a courts and the Palestinian shari’a court) to get and enforce a favourable judgment, but the 
new structures leave Palestinians with no legal authority over the administration of the waqf system. Recent legal 
disputes over the status of certain mosques and cemeteries (as waqf properties), and the special situation of waqf 
property in Jerusalem Old City are examined as sites of Palestinian resistance. 
 
 
 
 
* Haitam Suleiman is a Palestinian living in Israel and currently Assistant Professor in Law at al-Quds University, 
Jerusalem. This paper is based upon his PhD from Anglia Ruskin University (2009) on Reviving the Waqf in Palestine/Israel.  
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I. Introduction: legal pluralism & disputes over waqf 
property 
This article explores the conflict over land in Israel/Palestine, within a context of postcolonial 
legal pluralism, with particular reference to Islamic property held for religious charitable 
purposes (the waqf). Israel/Palestine inherits several legal traditions, offering often conflicting 
sources of legitimacy: Islamic, as applied by the Ottoman empire until 1918, and more recently 
by Jordan in the West Bank and Egypt in Gaza; British colonial, under the League of Nations 
Mandate (1923-48); and post-1948 Israeli, with borrowings from United States and European 
jurisdictions. British colonialism’s role in building the Israeli state has been re-asserted by 
Shamir: 
“Too little attention has also been given to the basic fact that the British, aided by all 
their colonial experience elsewhere, created and installed a functioning state in 
Palestine: a rather advanced web of administrative apparatuses and governmental 
departments, a sound infrastructure and, of course, a fully-developed, ready-to-use 
legal system”.1 
English-language literature on waqf in Israel/Palestine is limited, and relevant legislation and 
court rulings are often unpublished, or unavailable in English. This article is able to draw upon 
field research undertaken by a Palestinian Arab living in Israel, Haitam Suleiman, with Arabic, 
Hebrew and English language competence, and aware of nuances of language, even body 
language, and cultural background. Interviewees may have sought to mislead, where questions 
dealt with controversial and sensitive issues, and officials may withhold information, while the 
field-work was risky and interrupted by the current conflict. 
II. The Revival of waqf 
Waqf [pl. awqaf] in Arabic means hold, confinement or prohibition, and in Islamic shari’a law is 
a juridical institution for the reservation of property for religious purposes. A waqf is 
established by a living man or woman (the waqif = founder), who holds a certain revenue-
producing property and makes the (principal), inalienable in perpetuity, prohibited from sale, 
gift and inheritance. The property is placed under the stewardship of a fiduciary (wali or 
mutawalli) who assures that the revenues pass to the intended beneficiaries (mustahiqeen).2 
Under Shari’a law, while sadaqa (charity) should reach only the poor and needy, waqf can be 
directed to both poor and rich; Sadaqa may be owned, sold, or granted, but the waqf is 
perpetual, with no intervention in ownership, and is confined to fixed property, or things that 
have sustainable reserved revenues. There are three basic kinds of waqf. The first, the Khairy or 
charitable waqf, directs property revenues towards philanthropic goals. The second, the Ahli or 
family waqf, benefits family members, with the endower choosing what individuals and what 
lines of descent benefit; administrators are family members, and the revenue-bearing assets 
 
1  RONEN SHAMIR, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine, Cambridge 2000, at 11. 
2  SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World, London 2006. See also, 
MUSTAFA AHMAD ZARGA, Ahkam al-awqaf, [Awqaf Rulings], Dar ‘Ammar 1998. 
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circulated indefinitely.3 Finally, the Mushtarak or joint waqf, divided the revenues between 
philanthropy and family.  
Interestedly, given the contested state of waqf in Israel, the very first waqf was created by a 
Jewish convert to Islam who bequeathed his wealth to the Prophet for the benefit of the poor 
and needy. The juridical form of the waqf took shape in succeeding centuries and the jurist Abu 
Yusuf (d. 798) asserted that a waqf was valid only if irrevocable and made in perpetuity.4 Its 
perpetuity element distinguishes the waqf from the trusts and foundations found in Western 
legal systems, but it apparently influenced the early English trusts during the time of the 
crusades, when there was much population movement between Europe and the Holy Lands, 
including the Franciscan Friars. The University of Oxford in its early years may have been 
influenced by the waqf, with the 1264 Statutes of Merton College (significant in the founding of 
the college system) showing Islamic influences.5 
Awqaf flourished with the establishment of Muslim-ruled states, offering a means of diverting 
resources from consumption, and investing them in productive assets to provide either 
usufruct or revenues for future consumption by individuals or groups of individuals.6 Awqaf 
served many functions. They provided educational institutions with buildings, teaching 
materials, staff salaries, and scholarships for poor students, derived from the revenues of 
orchards and rental buildings, and independent of the state. They provided health services, 
public kitchens, orphanages, environmental protection and animal care. Awqaf stimulated 
economic activity, providing shops at low rent, public water fountains, and accommodation for 
commercial caravans. A range of public goods now provided by government agencies in the 
past came through private waqf, which have been called the most important and universal 
economic institution of Islamic society with reflective influance on the tax structure of the state, 
the redistribution of wealth in society and the urban fabric of Islamic cities.7 The waqf was an 
urban institution that shaped the civic space of Ottoman cities,8 while waqf property was 
estimated at over a third of the agricultural land in Turkey, Morocco, Egypt and Syria. In 
Recent times modern states in the Middle East however nationalized vast waqf properties, 
while new municipal government services increasingly supplanted the waqf. Legislation 
brought waqf under greater regulation or absolute prohibition, and contributed to the 
prevalence of secular law over shari’a principles, resulting in the stagnation of waqf. The family 
waqf was restricted, and some states forbade new creations, with the stipulations of waqf 
founders no longer treated as ‘sacred and inviolable’. The state claimed that the waqf was no 
longer serving its original purposes, and it could administer them better. The eclipse of waqf 
has left a vacuum in the arena of public services; students, the sick, homeless, travellers, the 
 
3  TIMUR KURAN, The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Contributions, and Limitation of the Waqf 
System, Law and Society Review, vol. 35, no. 4 (2001) 841-897, at 856. 
4  PETER C. HENNIGAN, The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A.H. Hanafi Legal 
Discourse, London 2004. 
5  MONICA M. GAUDIOSI, The influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: the Case of 
Merton College, 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1988) 1231-1261. 
6  MONZER KAHF, Financing the Development of Awqaf Property, Seminar Paper, IRTI, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, March 2-4, 
1998.  
7  FRANCIS EDWARD PETERS, Jerusalem and Mecca: The Typology of the Holy City in the Near East, New York 1986. 
8  RICHARD VAN LEEUWEN, Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus, Studies in Islamic Law and 
Society, vol. 11, Leiden 1999. 
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poor and prisoners are only some of the vulnerable who have lost the protection of the waqf. 
The waqf is, however, showing signs of reinvigoration, with Awqaf properties occupying a 
growing share of the societal wealth of Muslim countries and those with significant Muslim 
minorities. Since the oil crisis of the 1970s Islamic banking has developed new tools of finance, 
and waqf has emerged as a non-profit ‘third’ sector, distinct from the profit-based private sector 
and the official public sector. Its institutional protections are making it again a main actor in 
the social and economic life of Muslims.9 
III. Waqf in Palestine/Israel: special status 
As the waqf in main is a form of property or a land, therefore its legal influence should be 
attributed to the conflict over the land, ‘generally’, in the Middle East. The literature indicates 
that the waqf properties as the land in general were influenced by different and various means, 
mechanisms and law from those who ruled Palestine in the last two centuries. Before one 
proceeds to discuss the law of waqf in Palestine it is necessary to understand first the history of 
the legal system in Palestine followed by discussing the land laws in Palestine as this will help 
to comprehend the entire legal issues related to waqf law. Palestine is regarded a special case 
with a different status at all levels. The legal position in Palestine is simultaneously both one of 
the most complicated and most rare situations. The legal system in Palestine emerged in 
unsteady circumstances due to the several powers that ruled Palestine through history. The 
partition of Palestine led to the creation of complex and different law systems in the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem in addition to the parts of the country which were occupied in 
1948. The legal system in Palestine was based on the principles of the Islamic shari’a law until 
the end of the Ottoman rule in 1917. The British Mandate followed and remodelled the legal 
system, along with the Ottoman law-making the British introduced the principles of the Anglo-
Saxon system, which is based on Common Law. While the West Bank with eastern Jerusalem 
inclusive was under the rule of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1948, and the Jordanian 
legal system, which is influenced by many other systems prevailed. The Gaza Strip was under 
the Egyptian administration where the joint legal system of the former British Mandate 
prevailed. Later the Israeli occupation imposed its military law on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip after the 1967 war and put eastern Jerusalem subject to the local law of the Israeli occupier 
after annexing it in 1980. After the Oslo Accord, the Palestinian Authority was found and the 
jurisdiction of the new authority was agreed upon. The Palestinian legislators then started to 
unifying and harmonizing the diverse legal systems prevailing in the Palestinian territories. 
Since 1994 unifying legislation has been enacted for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.10  
Most waqf properties in Israel was expropriated under the Absentee property Law, and it is one 
of the most sensitive and complicated issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel claims 93 
per cent of its territory as public domain for the Jewish faith, and the process has isolated and 
contained the surviving Arab communities within Israel, while the rest of the Palestinian 
people have been displaced to peripheral locations (Gaza, the West Bank), which Israel has 
 
9  MONZER KAHF, Towards the Revival of Awqaf: A Few Fiqhi Issues to Reconsider, Presented at the Harvard Forum on 
Islamic Finance and Economics, October 1, 1999. See also, SAIT & LIM, supra n. 2. 
10  HAITAM SULEIMAN & ROBERT HOME, ‘God is an Absentee, too’: The Treatment of Waqf (Islamic Trust) Land in 
Israel/Palestine, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, (41:59; 2009), 49-65. 
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held under military occupation since 1967 and also has control of most of the land. During the 
period 1918-48 land dominated the efforts of the British Mandate. Among the first actions of 
the occupying British were to close the Ottoman land registers, prohibit all land transactions 
until a new registry was installed, and transfer much jurisdiction in land matters from Islamic 
shari’a courts to new secular land courts. The British colonial regime therefore had occupied the 
Palestinian legal systems.11 
The British established a Supreme Muslim Council in 1921, with a president and four members, 
to manage Shari’a affairs in Palestine. Its waqf activities from 1921 to 1936 were impressive:12 
 Twenty-one new mosques and three minarets built, and 313 mosques repaired (notably 
the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem).  
 224 new properties built, and 300 repaired, including shops, houses, and the waqf 
building (originally the Palace Hotel in Jerusalem, after 1948 used as Government 
offices).  
 draining swamps, planting trees on waqf lands, and enlarging waqf lands by the purchase 
of about 25,000 dunums.  
 maintaining schools and scholarships for Muslim students to universities in Egypt, Syria, 
and Europe.  
 establishing a Moslem orphanage, training midwives. 
In 1948 waqf land was estimated to comprise a sixth of the country, but estimates are unreliable, 
and the Israeli government does not disclose (and may not hold) data on the extent of waqf. In 
1980 the Custodian of Absentee Property estimated that about 70 percent of the land of the 
state of Israel might potentially have two claimants - an Arab and a Jew holding respectively a 
British Mandate and an Israeli deed to the same property.13 
The concept of absentee was recognised in Ottoman law, which distinguished different 
categories of absenteeism, and absentee property was theoretically held in suspense or trust.14 
After 1948 Israel applied the term to the Palestinians displaced from Israel (usually over 
relatively short distances, into Arab-controlled territory).15 The new Israeli state reformulated 
regulations devised in 1939 by the British for wartime conditions, as the 1949 Emergency 
Regulations on Property of Absentees. A Custodian of Absentee Property was instituted, 
similar to the preceding Mandate Custodian of Enemy Property. The first Emergency 
Regulation (Absentees’ Property) Law 1948 was contained in the Absentees Property Law 1950. 
Absentee land could be restored in only very restricted circumstances: if the absentee could 
prove that it was ‘for fear that the enemies of Israel might cause him or her harm’ or ‘otherwise 
 
11  JOHN STRAWSON, Reflections on Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian 
Self-determination, Penn State International Law Review vol. 20 (2002) 363-384. 
12  MICHAEL DUMPER, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State, Washington DC 1994. 
13  DUMPER, supra n. 12. 
14  FREDERIC M. GOADBY & MOSES J. DOUKHAN, The Land Law of Palestine, Tel Aviv 1935. 
15  SULEIMAN & HOME, supra n. 10. 
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than by reason of fear of military operations’. The APL caused the confiscation of two million 
dunams and given to the custodian, who later transferred the land to the development 
authority. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, state-owned lands previously in the 
possession of British Mandatory Authorities, and the property abandoned by Arab refugees 
passed into the control of the new Israeli administration. Waqf ownership passed from Muslim 
hands to the Custodian, who on behalf of the state could convey the properties to Jewish 
hands, disregarding shari’a law. Israel did not distinguish between waqf property and any 
other land, and the Custodian of Absentee claimed waqf property on the ground that the 
Supreme Muslim Council became an ‘absentee’ because most of its members were refugees. 
Thus the Custodian was a conduit through which land passed to the Israeli Development 
Authority, and later the Land Authority, as a means of ‘laundering’ confiscated Palestinian 
land. The Absentee Law 1950 prohibited the shari’a court from their rights to supervise the 
awqaf properties. The Israeli high court held that the custodian was neither a trustee over the 
‘absent’ property or for the original owners of the properties, nor responsible for their 
management, and the absentee was not entitled to take legal action against the custodian.16 The 
five Ottoman tenure types, which were as follows: 
 Mulk land (fully-owned urban freehold property). The 7 per cent of the land of Israel still 
in private ownership is mostly former mulk land, mostly located within Arab villages. 
 Miri land. This had heritable use rights, and could revert to the state if not cultivated 
after three years (mahlul), and then be auctioned to anyone prepared to cultivate it. Miri 
land represented most of the cultivable land and, where not forfeited by the refugees of 
1948, was mostly acquired by the Israeli state through various means, particularly strict 
application of the three-year rule. Any land shown by aerial photography as not 
cultivated for a sufficient period was forfeited, not back to the village but to the state, by 
means of an official declaration in words: ‘I hereby declare that the area specified in the 
appendix is government property’, the appendix being a rough boundary line on the 
aerial photo. This declaration was sent to the village head and posted on the land 
(usually left under a stone), or made orally. The onus of proof for any counter-claim then 
fell to any prior owner, who had 45 days to commission a cadastral survey and lodge an 
appeal, but many owners would be unaware of the declaration, and few could afford to 
mount a defence, especially when they had little hope of success in court.17  
 State land required for public purposes (in Turkish matruka, meaning withdrawn) and 
registered with the state or local authority. This included military bases, roads, forest 
land and public open spaces within villages.  
 Dead land (mawat), i.e. uncultivated, unirrigated and vacant land, needing government 
consent to bring into cultivation. Islamic law defined ‘dead land’ as sufficiently far from 
an inhabited place (a distance regarded as in practice a mile and a half) that a human 
voice could not be heard. Mawat included the Negev desert and the 3000 sq.km. of 
 
16  Court Case of Civil Appeal 58/54 Mahmud Habab v. Custodian of Absentee Property, (1956) 10 PD 912. 
17  SANDY KEDAR, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israel Law and The Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967, 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, no. 4 (2001) 945-949. 
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mountain and desert east of Hebron, Jerusalem & Nablus. Article 6 of the Mandate made 
it and matruka land available for Jewish settlement. 
 Waqf land, held in trust for Muslim religious and charitable purposes. This was 
confiscated by the state of Israel after 1948, when it comprised a sixth of the count. 
A significant law in the confiscation of Palestinian lands, including waqf land, was another 
modification of Mandate emergency regulations (a term carefully retained in its title: the 
Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Law, amended in 1951. This law derived 
legitimacy not only from Mandate law but also the Ottoman land code, which had provided 
for special commissions to record abandoned villages and reclassify vacant land lying idle and 
‘exposed to the sun’ (shamsieh) as state domain. Much of the land abandoned by the 
Palestinians in 1948 was not recorded in the Ottoman or Mandate land registers, as many did 
not register their land for fear of tax collectors and military conscription. While much urban 
property was held freehold (mulk in the Ottoman system), agricultural land was classed as 
Miri, in which formal and ultimate ownership was held by the State, and which if uncultivated 
for three years could be reclaimed by the state. The Palestinians’ culture of the sacred waqf is 
reflected in their treatment of waqf plots, often olive groves, cultivated by community 
volunteers, who would afterwards meticulously clean from their clothes traces of the sacred 
waqf soil. The 1951 Law, however, empowered the Ministry of Agriculture to declare lands as 
‘waste’ lands (Article 2) and to take control of ‘uncultivated’ lands (Article 4). Such land could 
thus be confiscated without having to confirm the absentee status of owners.  
Another important law was the so-called 1965 amendment, described by Israeli scholars as a 
‘reform’ of the waqf in Israel: the Absentees’ Property (Amendment No. 3) (Release and Use of 
Endowment Property) Law 1965). In 1956 the Board of Trustees of the Muslim waqf, which by 
then was made up of collaborators appointed by the government, who would sell or exchange 
land with the ILA unaccountable to the Muslim community, leading to violence within the 
community, including assassinations. The 1965 amendment represented a further stage in the 
confiscation of any remaining Muslim awqaf. Authorising the transfer of waqf property to the 
Custodian, denying the conditions that were attached when the property was endowed, and 
ensuring that property confiscated from the waqf would not be returned, regardless of whether 
the mutawalli or the beneficiary is ‘absentee’. The law empowered the Custodian to pass the 
property to the Development Authority or to board of trustees, ostensibly to prevent its 
neglect, but in practice to sell it for development, contradicting the fundamental perpetual 
characteristic of waqf land. The Law freed the remaining waqf from restrictions under shari’a 
law, and restricted the political use of funds generated from those awqaf. The amendment 
granted the state a further tool to transfer the remaining waqf properties from Muslim hands to 
the Jewish community through the use of Muslim ‘state appointees’ to a board of trustees. The 
board fulfilled the wishes of the government that appointed them and they did not acquire 
either any independence from the government or gain any credibility from the Muslim 
community. Section 4 of the 1965 amended law puts all Muslim sacred places at risk, since the 
custodian was authorised to sell them, and has no obligation to protect them. The effect of a 
succession of Absentee Property Laws has precluded Muslims from protecting and 
maintaining their sacred places, many mosques and cemeteries were subsequently transferred 
by the custodian to the development authority, which sold on to Jewish investment companies, 
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and in the end many mosques and cemeteries were converted into museums, cafes, restaurants 
or even synagogues. The remaining mosques which have not been sold are deserted, and 
cannot be maintained and used by Muslims who are denied access to them. 
IV. Waqf land in Jerusalem: special status 
The situation with waqf property is particularly complicated in Jerusalem, because of its special 
status under international law. Waqf represents some 90 percent of property within the Old 
City (both Islamic and Christian).18 During the Mandate the Palestinians used waqf properties 
as a buffer against the sale of land to the Jews. Jordan continues to exercise its sovereignty and 
law over waqf institutions in Jerusalem through the Ministry of Waqf in Amman, and, while 
Jordanian law became obsolete with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the 
West Bank and Gaza, it still forms the legal basis for some institutions in Jerusalem where the 
PA is not allowed to function.19 Jordanian control allowed the decline of waqf until 1967: only 
16 new awqf were founded in Jerusalem during the 19 years of Jordanian rule, compared with 
90 under the first 23 years of Israeli occupation (1967-1990), giving the waqf a central position in 
Palestinian society.20 Many Jerusalem residents rent from waqf institutions. Since 1967 rents 
agreed under Jordanian rule are not recognised by Israeli law, and have not increased in line 
with inflation, resulting in dilapidation of much waqf property in the Old City. Israel 
maintained the sovereignty of Muslim institutions and the Waqf in East Jerusalem (including 
the Old City) remains under the relevant authorities in Jordan. Individual waqf property is 
recorded in the Shari’a Court in Jerusalem and in the Department of Islamic Awaqf, but the 
extent of waqf property in the Old City is not publicly available. Cases decided by the Shari’a 
Court in East Jerusalem on rent or tenancy issues could only be enforced by the civil courts, 
which are Israeli and so not recognised by the Shari’a Court. The mutawalli of family waqf 
cannot resolve waqf property disputes, because a Palestinian court decision cannot be enforced, 
while they refuse to take action in the Israeli shari’a court because this would be recognizing its 
jurisdiction over Jerusalem. As a result of this ‘void in legal authority’, the family waqf 
managers and the Administration have had to rely on moral and community pressure to 
enforce decisions. Investment in property and establishing new awqaf were neglected as a 
result of the uncertainty and the ambiguity, leading to property blight in Jerusalem particularly 
in the Old City.21 The Tenancy Protection Act of 1954 provides that a tenant cannot be evicted 
either for non-payment of rent, alterations, or sub-letting if resident for more than fifteen years. 
Additionally most leases allow a tenant to sub-let with mutawalli having no control over the 
sub-letting but still responsible for upkeep. Rent increases were linked to the cost of living 
index, but only for rents charged in Israeli shekels, while most properties in the Old City are 
charged in Jordanian dinars, tenants can avoid rent increases with support from Israeli courts. 
Therefore, some landlords had changed rents to Israeli shekels, seen as more stable than 
Jordanian, but deflation of the Israeli currency devalued these rents, while Israeli law prohibits 
 
18  SAMER BAGAEEN, Evaluating the Effects of Ownership and Use on the Condition of Property in the Old City of Jerusalem, 
Housing Studies, vol. 21, no. 1 (2006) 135-150. 
19  YITZHAK REITER, Islamic Institutions in Jerusalem: Palestinian Muslim Administration under Jordanian and Israeli Rule, 
The Hague/London/Boston 1997, at 27-28. 
20  YITZHAK REITER, Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate, London/Portland 1996. 
21  DUMPER, supra n. 12. 
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lease revisions or eviction of tenants.22 Commercial and cultural activities could flourish with 
Palestinians avoiding the full control of Israel, but investment and development were 
neglected because of legal uncertainties and ambiguities, as the field-work revealed. The Israeli 
district court issued an initial decision allowing itself the right to review cases related to 
Islamic Waqf property in Jerusalem but with the potential to be applied all over Palestine. 
1. The battle in courts 
In 1951 the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Custodian agreed that the ministry would be 
directly responsible for the management of sacred places, despite the fact that they are 
considered as ‘absentee’ properties, approved by the government in 1952.23 
The Protection of Holy Places Law 1967 (Article 1) states that: 
“The Holy Places shall be protected from destruction and any other violation 
and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of 
different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to 
those places”. 
This guarantee was inserted to neutralize international public opinion, but there was no clear 
definition of ‘sacred place’ in the Israeli legal system. Adjudication is still governed by a 1924 
Mandate law, upheld by the Israel Supreme Court, with matters relating to religious rights in 
the Holy Places (including disputes between denominations of the same religion, and between 
religions) decided by the government, and not adjudicated in the courts. About a third of 
Muslim waqf property, principally mosques and graveyards still in use, was not expropriated 
after 1948, but various approaches have been deployed to obtain the rest. More confiscations of 
mosques and cemeteries are occurring, contrary to Islamic law.  In the beginning of the 1990’s, 
the Islamic Movement in Israel started to survey the waqf properties, intending to protect and 
develop them, and to prevent attempts by Israeli authorities to change their status and sell 
them off through the state-appointed trustees. Among the disputes over waqf properties was 
that involving the Muslim cemetery of Haifa, (Jamia’ al-estiqlal) used since the Mandate. In 1993 
the shari’a court in Haifa confirmed an agreement between two mutawallis of the in Haifa and 
an Israeli company regarding a deal to develop the site, but some months later one of the 
signatory mutawallis applied to the shari’a court to cancel the agreement, since the same qadi 
Zaki Midlij who permitted the agreement disowned it.  The mutawalli then applied to the High 
Court, relying on an additional statement of qadi Midlij, in which he claimed he had been co-
erced under armed threat from the company’s lawyer. The police questioned the qadi, who was 
convicted and resigned as a qadi of the shari’a court of appeal. The two parties agreed to 
transfer the case to the civil court in Haifa, where it is still pending. The Adalah organisation 
petitioned the Supreme Court in the name of Muslim religious leaders to demand legal 
recognition for the Muslim Holy Places in Israel. A special committee was formed in 2000, to 
investigate the situation of Arab holy sites, with representation from the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, the Ministry of National Infrastructures, the Israel Lands Administration, and the 
 
22  Information from Field-work interviews undertaken by the present writer in 2008. 
23  SHMUEL BERKOVITS, “How dreadful is this Place!” Holiness, Politics, and Justice in Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Israel, 
Carta Jerusalem 2006. 
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Regional Committee for Arab Local Councils. The committee prepared a plan for abandoned 
non-Jewish holy sites, compiling a list of 53 Muslim holy sites and 58 abandoned Muslim 
cemeteries, but the Ministry of Religious Affairs did not implement the committee’s 
recommendations. 
In Bhmr 1931/97 the Israeli civil court held that a mosque should be considered as a sacred 
place only if the property itself is sacred (the use in itself being insufficient). In Islamic law, 
however, a shari’a court qadi can confirm the sacred element: mosques and graveyards 
remained sacred, even without a roof. The qadi of the shari’a Court of Appeal Ahmed Natur 
issued a marsoom qadai (legal decree) attempting a tougher line, legally binding on all shari’a 
qadis. With the Muslim waqf places, and the sacred specifically, gradually losing their status, 
with abuse of waqf properties increasingly common, has become a routine practice, with 
attempts to use the shari’a courts to release them. The qadi’s marsoom was for the ‘public benefit’ 
of Muslims in accordance with Islamic law, and he criticised the Israeli state for confiscating 
awqaf properties. He proposed procedural steps to protect the remaining awqaf from abolition, 
Qadi Natour states that the shari’a qadis are not allowed to deliver any fatwa which may permit 
the use of sacred waqf properties or any other awqaf, for other purposes than declared in the 
waqfiya. Even if the qadi tries to rely upon shari’a judgments, they may violate basic principles. 
Mosques are sacred even when closed or deserted, ‘as long as one prayer was performed 
there’. The qadi cannot issue or confirm agreements on waqf property where affecting sale, rent, 
or substitution. Shari’a courts appointing mutawallis should call them to account every six 
months, with reports kept in an official register available to the public (this procedure 
important as before many fatwas and approvals went inadequately documented). The shari’a 
courts should dismiss mutawalli who misappropriate their position and made no action to 
protect the waqf. The shari’a courts are not allowed to appoint mutawallis without permission of 
the shari’a court of appeal, choosing only those who have good character, history and no 
criminal record. The Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, however, by letter of 3 June 1996 
rejected the marsoom, claiming that qadi Natour is not authorised to issue it. Qadi Natour 
challenged the minister as improperly intervening in the judicial system, arguing that the 
shari’a Court of Appeal had jurisdiction.  
The case of the Beer el-Sabe ‘big mosque’ first mosque in the Naqab (Negev), it was founded in 
1906, Arab Bedouin sheikhs contributing half of the funding. After 1948 the mosque was 
confiscated and used as a court and prison until 1953, then as a museum until 1991, but has 
since been neglected and unprotected, surrounded by restaurants and bars, a municipal 
building and a public garden. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel sat to adjudicate on a 
petition submitted by ADALAH.24 In 2002, a request was made for the re-opening of the Big 
Mosque in Beer el-Sabe (Beer Sheva) to allow Muslim residents and visitors of Beer el-Sabe to 
pray in it. At the time Beer el-Sabe had some 259 synagogues for 180,000 Jewish residents (one 
for every 700), while the 5,000 Muslims had no mosque, not to mention the 150,000 Muslims in 
the surrounding Naqab. The petition was submitted by ADALAH on behalf of the Association 
for Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, the Islamic Committee in the Naqab, 23 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, against the Municipality of Beer el-Sabe the Development 
 
24  ADALAH, The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, available at http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/6677, 
last accessed 1 August 2015.  
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Authority, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Minister of Science. ADALAH argued that 
free access to the mosque was protected by the right to freedom of religion. The Israeli police 
force claimed that reinstating the mosque would create inter-community conflict, and, the 
municipality argued, would bring the ownership of all Muslim religious sites into dispute, 
even the Temple Mount and Jerusalem. ADALAH argued that maintaining the status quo would 
continue discrimination against Muslims, violating the right of freedom of worship. ADALAH 
added that there was no presence or representation of any Muslims from Beer el-Sabe or 
elsewhere on the Committee, and that, as it was formed by and constituted of members of 
various governmental offices, who are essentially a party to the dispute with an interest in 
maintaining the status quo, the Committee’s recommendations were neither just nor objective 25. 
Justices Procaccia, Hayut and Jubran ordered that the parties review their positions and within 
sixty days reach an agreement to change the mosque to a cultural and social centre for use by 
the Muslim community of Beer el-Sabe, except for the purpose of praying. In 2009 the Supreme 
Court upholds the previous decisions to disallowing Muslims to use the building as a mosque. 
In the case of 2289/81 involving the waqf Alestiqlal cemetery in Haifa, the Muslim community in 
Haifa petitioned in the district court to prevent the mutawallis transferring the bones of the 
Muslim dead elsewhere, and to develop the site. The court claimed that it had no jurisdiction, 
but referred the case to the shari’a court, which allowed the transfer, asserting that the 
sacredness of a cemetery lapses after 36 years of abandonment, contrary to most Islamic 
scholarship. Similar approaches have been adopted in other cases. In 232/76 (Shukri v Sharia 
Court- Bagats), the court upheld and reiterated the Alistiqlal judgment. The qadi Tawfiq Asaliya 
in 1969 stated that after 36 years the status of the Salma cemetery in Jaffa changed to ‘outworn’, 
but he reversed that decision in 1991, now claiming that ‘the sacredness of grave-yards is 
eternal and this entitlement cannot be nullified as it belongs to Allah’, so no-one should 
destroy graves there. The Ijzim cemetery raised similar issues recently, with demonstrations on 
site. In 1949, a Jewish settlement was built on the lands of the Palestinian village Ijzim, whose 
inhabitants fled after the 1948 war. In 2002 Jewish developers bought land there which 
included a graveyard of Muslim and Christian Palestinians. In 2004, (the ‘Al-Aqsa institution 
for the development of waqf properties) applied to the Israeli Supreme Court to stop 
construction work because of the destruction of Muslim graves. The appeal relied upon the 
2004 fatwa of qadi Ahmed Natour, stating that: 
“the sacredness of grave-yards is eternal and no one is permitted to remove it... 
insulting graves and the cemetery for the purpose of building a residential area as in 
this case is forbidden.... the landscape of the grave-yard (even though it was not used 
for long time) is still considered as waqf and it cannot be confiscated, nor it can be used 
for other purposes” (translated from Arabic).26 
The developers disputed that the land was a cemetery, arguing that the grave-yard recognised 
by the authorities was at some distance, and that local Muslims did not regard it as such, but 
admitted that graves had been discovered on the site, which the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
barred from removal. In 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the petition and allowed construction 
to continue. The Maamano-Allah Graveyard in West Jerusalem has been another recent 
 
25  ADALAH, supra n. 24. 
26  Available at http://www.iaqsa.com/, last accessed 10 August 2015. 
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contested case. Dating from at least the 13th century, with Muslim tradition holding that 
companions of the Prophet Muhammad are buried there, the cemetery was declared absentee 
property in 1955 (with no publicity in Arabic as required under Israeli law), and over the next 
30 years, the municipality of Jerusalem gradually acquired ownership, with objections being 
filed but over-ruled. In 2004 the Simon Wiesenthal Centre began constructing a Museum of 
Tolerance on part of the cemetery, with a much-publicized ground-breaking ceremony 
attended by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Israeli President and Vice Prime 
Minister, the Mayor of Jerusalem, and dignitaries and guests from around the world. The 
Centre aims to ‘fortify the value of tolerance between peoples and between man to man’. When 
work uncovered human graves, the Al-Aqsa institution petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
provisional injunction preventing construction, and the dispute was brought to the shari’a and 
civil courts, who issued conflicting judgments. In 2009 the Israeli Supreme Court confirmed 
that three Muslim cemeteries (MaamanoAllah, Ijzim & Alberwa) are confiscated to Jewish 
developers, against Palestinian objections. 
V. Conclusion 
Whilst investigating the reasons for the waqf’s decline, a great many participants have shared 
the view that there is a prevalent difficulty with regard to the enforcement of shari’a courts’ 
judgments and this has caused a very real problem; as one interviewee (mutawalli of durri waqf 
in Jerusalem) observed “if you have a rent problem with a tenant, and you take a legal action 
against him, the court decision hardly can be enforced.” Another example, a conflict of laws 
exists at least in Jerusalem district, where both the Israeli and Jordanian laws are applied. 
Moreover, one shari’a qadi pointed out “that there is a problem with court jurisdiction. He cited 
an example, where his shari’a court should have decided in disputes on waqf cases, however, 
his decision was not accepted and the case was raised to the civil courts.” As a result of the 
difficulty with regard to jurisdiction and enforcement, there is confusion for the mutawallis who 
want to take legal action to protect the waqf. As one mutawalli added “you have to search for the 
proper court, so that you will be able to enforce the court decision. Often you need to choose between 
shari’a court (either the Palestinian or the Israeli) or civil courts (Israeli).”27  
Furthermore, the results show that Israel through its land policy is still confiscating waqf 
properties, and preventing access to them. Some recent cases emphasises this point (i.e. 
Maamanollah & Ijzim cemeteries). The field-work revealed; contemporary techniques of 
management were commonly developed to improve the efficiency of collecting revenue, i.e. a 
family mutawalli of a huge waqf in Jerusalem is using a highly sophisticated computer program 
to divide the profits over the beneficiaries. By contrast one mutawalli observes “the corruption 
and maladministration led to conversion of some awqaf to privately owned property, this is of course due 
to the absence of enforcement by the legal system that brings into account waqf players who 
misappropriate their position.” The field-work indicates that there is absence of definite figures on 
the extent of awqaf in Israel. The Israeli government is still holding the records which show the 
extent and quantity of awqaf at least inside Israel. The results from previous studies are based 
on insufficient data. It is noted that there was contradictory results. Moreover, the literature 
reveals that the historic role of the waqf is considered by Israel as a threat to its physical 
 
27  The present writer interviewed Mutawalli (waqf manager) in 2008. 
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integrity. This assertion according to the field-work remains valid despite the physical 
occupation over the Palestinian community and the completion of its administrative and legal 
system. The results show that Israel still fully controls the waqf properties. There are different 
degrees of control; Israel controls waqf administration, in terms of payments of their salaries 
and appointment and the incumbents always have to demonstrate their loyalty to the Israeli 
state.  The State has also re-established shari’a courts and replaced the shari’a court of appeal in 
Jerusalem. Such a new structure has left the Muslim qadis and officials with no legal authority 
over the administration of the waqf system; they were given only an advisory insignificant role. 
The Ministry for Religious Affairs established a department to be responsible for the 
Palestinian religious community. Other communities in Israel were given a greater autonomy 
over the administration of their religious affairs, for instance the Absentee law exempted some 
of church properties from confiscation as for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was not 
considered an absentee as defined by the legislation, though in fact the patriarchate is located 
in Jordanian Jerusalem. The Druze were nevertheless given a relative independence over it 
waqf properties, the 1962 Druze Religious Courts Law had authority over personal status and 
endowment properties.  
The main piece of legislation that has influenced the awqaf is the Absentee Law 1950 which 
gave rise to the confiscation of almost all waqf properties in Israel. The Third Amendment of 
the Absentee Property Law in 1965 described as a ‘reform’ of the waqf in Israel, has in fact, 
effectively implemented the priorities of the Israeli policy and completed its objective, namely, 
controlling the entire waqf system in Israel. The Amendment has freed the remaining waqf from 
the restrictions of shari’a law, i.e. sale; also, it restricted the political use of funds generated 
from those awqaf. Furthermore, the amendment granted the state a further tool to transfer the 
remaining waqf properties from Muslim hands to the Jewish community through the use of 
Muslim ‘state’s appointees’ board of trustees. The results show that due to the 1965 ‘reform’ 
many mosques and cemeteries were sold contrary to principles of shari’a law.  
A modern, positivist ideology of law and the state supported the colonists/colonialists in 
dispossessing the colonised, and trapped the indigenous Palestinians in a world of 
manipulated bureaucracy. The state of Israel came into existence in 1948 as the inheritor of a 
body of non-Jewish law derived from Ottoman law, as ‘enriched’ by British Mandate law. The 
court may intervene and issue a decision, potentially making all waqf property vulnerable to 
confiscation. Having driven out most of the Palestinians, it then modified the Mandate 
institution of the Custodian of Enemy Property, designed to hold such property in trust 
pending the end of hostilities, into the Custodian of Absentee Property, drawing upon the legal 
concept of ‘absentee’ in the Ottoman Land Code. The new state already had state and waste 
land transferred to it by the outgoing Mandate administration, and used its powers against 
absentee property to confiscate large tracts of land, both miri (or cultivated) land, taking over 
uncultivated or abandoned land under Ottoman provisions. It treated waqf land as little 
different from other absentee property, disregarding the perpetuity element conferred under 
shari’a law, although ‘holy’ and ‘sacred’ places were placed under special protection, and there 
were particular arrangements for the Old City of Jerusalem. For the Palestinians waqf property 
during the Mandate period had been used as a buffer against Jewish land acquisition, but this 
protection was gradually eroded. Palestinian attempts since the 1990s to revive waqf status and 
protect mosques and cemeteries from confiscation and change of use have generally been 
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denied in Israeli courts, while shari’a court judgments over-ruled. As expressed by the director 
of Awqaf in Jerusalem, petitioning the Israeli court is ‘like walking into a dark tunnel. Nobody 
can tell what is waiting for him at the other end’. While the waqf has successfully functioned for 
long periods under different conditions; its modern decline seems predictable. The legal 
system in Israel is a fundamental component and its exceedingly overregulated rules alongside 
with obstacles of enforcement procedures, made any different outcome unfeasible to achieve 
without retaining waqf’s autonomy and independence. Beyond doubts, the decline is due to 
absence of shari’a law that can embrace success, development and reform of the waqf system. 
